I. Regulatory Reliance on Market Discipline
In 1982, Congress lifted statutory requirements for mortgage loans originated by federally chartered banks and thrifts. 1 Titles III and IV of the Garn-St. Germain Act replaced requirements such as maximum loan-to-value ratios with a general authorization to make real estate loans subject to the restrictions and requirements that federal banking regulators may prescribe. 2 Most state legislatures followed the lead of the Congress, either by also lifting rigid statutory requirements or by relying on state wild-card statutes to achieve the same result. 3 In addition, Title VIII of the Garn-St. Germain Act allowed non-federally chartered housing creditors to offer alternative mortgage instruments to the same extent authorized by federal regulators. 4 After Congress lifted rigid statutory constraints on mortgage lending by banks and thrifts in 1982, the regulators were faced with three possible options as the new form of mortgage market regulation. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency summarized its options in 1983 as follows:
1. Adopt a regulation that reaffirms the limitations that existed under 12 U.S.C. 371 before the 1982 amendment . . . 2. Adopt a regulation that modifies the limitations that existed under 12 U.S.C. 371 before the 1982 amendment and currently exist in the interpretive rulings. 3. Adopt a regulation that imposes no limitations rescinds current regulations which do impose limitations. 5 It chose the third option. The Comptroller justified this from the regulations, factors such as market forces and management philosophies are the r real estate lending practices. . . . [D] ecisions concerning the forms and terms of national bank lending are properly the 6 Similarly, after initially proposing to retain some regulatory requirements such as LTV ratios, the Federal Home Loan
In response to the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 10 the federal regulators were for real estate lending by insured depository institutions. 11 The regulators made two decisions that confirmed their preference for a free-market approach to the extent governing statutes would permi real estate lending, rather than impose regulations setting minimum requirements for real estate lending operations for all banks and thrifts. 12 The second decision that the regulators made after the 1991 Act was to employ a principles approach in their guidelines, rather than requiring or prohibiting particular practices. While initially proposing specific LTV ratio limits, for example, the agencies ultimately adopted a principles approach listing general principles underwriting that should guide bank management in authorizing specific loan products and practices. 13 This was a 7. Implementation of New Powers;; Limitation on Loans to One Borrower, 48 Fed. Reg. 23,032, 23,035-37 (May 23, 1983) (stating that for private mortgage insurance was required for the part of the loan balance that exceeded eighty percent of the value).
8. free-market approach to the extent the 1991 Act would permit it. The 1992 agency standards relied on bank management to determine permitted products and practices. They required that banks and thrifts establish and maintain written internal real estate lending policies which were consistent with safe and sound banking practices, including prudent underwriting standards. 14 Abusive practices again surfaced after the 1992 and 1996 revisions to the real estate lending standards. Between 1999 and 2001, the federal bank regulatory agencies issued three guidances on real estate lending. The first concerned subprime lending, and it was motivated by actions of insured depository institutions, who were increasingly originating subprime loans to increase their profits loans which exhibited significantly higher risks of default than traditional bank lending. 15 The second concerned high LTV residential real estate lending, and its publication was motivated by the fact that insured depository institutions were increasingly originating residential real estate loans in amounts exceeding eighty percent of appraised value in order to increase their profits which created great risks of default and severe losses associated with such loans. 16 The third was an Expanded Guidance on Subprime Lending, and it was motivated, again, by the higher risks inherent in subprime lending programs, as well as, for the first time, by recognition that some forms of subprime lending may be abusive or predatory. 17 Despite recognition of the emergence of risky loan products, all three 14. Id. at 62,897. The guidelines did contain LTV ratios for different types of real estate loans. See id. at 62,891-93. However, even the guidelines specified no LTV limits for mortgages on owner-occupied one-to-four family residential property and for home equity loans. policies to control the risks inherent in subprime and high LTV lending programs, and to avoid possible violations of consumer protection laws. 18 prohibit loans made without regard to ability to repay. 19 This is the only regulatory prohibition that a federal agency has issued regarding real estate lending standards. The timing is revealing because it was done at the same time and in the same regulation that preempted state predatory lending laws. 20 Thus, the net effect was to impose far fewer prohibitions on 18 . See, for example, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., supra note 15, which stated that:
Institutions should recognize the additional risks inherent in subprime lending and determine if these risks financial condition, size, and level of capital support. Institutions that engage in subprime lending in any significant way should have board-approved policies and procedures, as well as internal controls that identify, measure, monitor, and control these additional risks.
It also provided, with respect to consumer compliance issues, that:
Institutions that originate or purchase subprime loans must take special care to avoid violating fair lending and consumer protection laws and regulations. Higher fees and interest rates combined with compensation incentives can borrowers to subprime products for reasons other than the compliance management program must identify, monitor and control the consumer protection hazards associated with subprime lending.
Id.
19 22 The guidance was motivated by the increased offering of loans that allowed borrowers to defer payment of principal and, sometimes, interest (i.e., interest-only and payment-option adjustable rate mortgages), as well as by reduced documentation requirements. 23 The guidance continued to rely on bank management to decide the policies and products that would serve to minimize risks to the banks and thrifts. 24 It made only two changes to its earlier, complete reliance on bank management and narrow scope of coverage. First, it cautioned banks to include an evaluation of the maturity at the fully indexed rate, assuming a fully amortizing repayment schedule. 25 It also advised banks to demonstrate mitigating factors supporting the underwriting decision in the event of risk layering, such as reduced documentation loans. 26 Second, for the first time, the agencies applied the guidance to bank and thrift affiliates. 27 While the agencies recognized the consumer protection issues raised by many product offerings, they continued to rely 21 on disclosure to address such concerns. 28 Thus, a largely freemarket approach continued to be favored with bank management determining the appropriate policies to employ, and products to offer, and consumers determining the risks such products pose. The last interagency guidance on real estate lending was issued in July 2007. It was motivated by concern over the increasing use of adjustable rate mortgage products with low initial payments based on an introductory rate that expires after a short period. 29 The final guidance also applies to bank and thrift affiliates. 30 The 2007 guidance reiterates the principles that were announced in the earlier guidances dating back to 1993. 31 [T]hese products, typically offered to subprime borrowers, present heightened risks to lenders and borrowers. Often, these products have additional characteristics that increase risk. These include qualifying borrowers based on limited or no documentation of income or imposing substantial prepayment penalties or prepayment penalties that extend beyond the initial fixed interest period. mitigating factors, such as substantial liquid reserves or assets. 33 With respect to consumer protection concerns, apart from cautioning that loan underwriting should consider the upon to protect consumers in the final 2007 interagency guidance. 34 In summary, after the lifting of statutory requirements for mortgage loans in 1982, regulatory requirements were lifted as well. The federal regulators relied on bank management to ensure sound operations, and on consumers to protect themselves against abusive loan practices. The only loan products that were actually prohibited in the period from 1983 to 2007 were loans made without regard to the ability to repay, and even this prohibition was embraced only by the Comptroller of the Currency, and only for national banks and their subsidiaries not for bank affiliates. Other regulators merely cautioned banks and thrifts, through regulatory against making loans without regard to the ability to repay. Thus, from 1982 to 2007, the a reliance on freemarket forces.
Id

II. Expected Versus Actual Outcomes in a Deregulated Environment
In lifting rigid statutory requirements in 1982, Congress had two immediate purposes in mind: (1) to ensure an adequate supply of credit for home mortgage transactions by 33 . Id. 34. Id. at 37,572. The guidance also noted that:
Fundamental consumer protection principles relevant to the underwriting and marketing of mortgage loans include: according to its terms;; and Providing information that enables consumers to understand material terms, costs, and risks of loan products at a time that will help the consumer select a product.
Id. at 37,574. These were the only two principles announced.
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[Vol. 30:154 allowing more creative and flexible financing, and (2) to allow banks and thrifts to become stronger participants in the home financing market. 35 However, these immediate purposes must be understood as qualified by the long-standing federal policy of ensuring the safety and soundness of bank and thrift institutions. 36 In addition, these immediate purposes must also be understood in the context of a series of enactments that occurred in 1974, 37 1988, 38 and 1994, 39 all of which were aimed at eliminating abusive practices in the residential real estate lending process.
Thus, legislative enactments over the entire 1974 to 1994 period reveal a desire to achieve three outcomes: (1) to ensure an adequate supply of credit for home mortgage loans, (2) to ensure that such loans are provided in a safe and sound manner by banks and thrifts, among other institutions, and (3) to ensure that such loans do not contain terms and are not offered through practices that are potentially abusive toward consumers. As discussed in Part I of this Article, the means that the regulators embraced to achieve these goals relied upon market discipline rather than regulatory restriction. 
A. Expected Outcomes
Regulators expected that market-based decisions would lead to innovative loan products, which would maximize availability of credit and which practices. Lender self-interest, bounded by the legal mandate offerings. 40 Consumer self-interest was also relied upon to weed out unsafe products and practices. 41 Bank regulators were trained in the economic sciences. This expectation was in line with the prevailing view in the legal and economic communities. 42 
B. Actual Outcomes
Did banks and thrifts, as well as the rest of the mortgage loan industry, choose to offer only loans that the industry perspective? This was the predicted outcome based on a reliance on market discipline. But what was the actual outcome?
Unsafe Products and Practices
The most revealing outcome is one that examines the mortgage practices of regulated banks and thrifts. These institutions were subject to the general prohibition against 43 as well as the uniform guidelines cautioning against unaffordable loans, to repay. 44 discipline did not prevent unsafe lending practices by these institutions, then they certainly would not prevent unsafe lending practices by non-affiliated and less-regulated mortgage companies.
The mortgage products and practices that emerged were: (a) adjustable rate mortgages ( ARMs ) with low initial rates that lead to substantial increases in loan payments after the -option loans in which the borrower could choose an amount to pay, including a minimum payment that did not include all accrued interest, until a recast of the payments at a later point, which would significantly increase loan payments;; (c) loans made ity to repay, including limiteddocumentation or no-documentation loans;; and (d) loans made requiring very little or no borrower equity, including first lien mortgage loans that tolerated piggyback loans.
ARMs introduce the risk of sticker shock after the expiration 45 For example,
-rate payment, even if short-term interest rates remained 46 However, since interest rates increased in 2006, the payment shock was estimated to be 50 percent. 47 Paymentoption loans introduce the risk of another form of sticker shock, namely an increase in monthly payments upon recast of the loan. 48 In payment-option loans, the borrower can choose to pay a minimum payment which does not include all accrued interest and does not include payment of principal. 49 50 However, when the outstanding balance reaches a certain threshold then the payment option expires and the loan is recast to require monthly payments of both interest and principal. 51 No-documentation or low-documentation loans add the risk that the lender has no assurance that the borrower is able to afford the loan, either initially or after a reset of interest rates or recast of payments. From 2000 to 2005, the number of subprime loans made without full documentation of income climbed from twenty-six percent of subprime mortgages in 2000 to forty-four percent in 2005. 52 Finally, piggyback loans add the risk that the borrower has very little equity in the home. 53 In the event of a significant decline in the fair market value of the property, refinancing becomes difficult or impossible. 54 Moreover, the risk of default to the market decline. 55 By the end of 2006, thirty-two percent of home purchase borrowers relied on piggyback loans to finance their purchases. 56 The widespread offering of these risky loan products was documented by research analysts at Credit Suisse. 57 Not only were individually risky products introduced, but there was also a layering of risks. Payment-option ARMs are especially risky due to a layering of two sets of sticker shock: one due to the interest rate reset and another due to the recast of payments. A no-documentation payment-option ARM then adds a third layer of risk due to an inability to assess ustry surveys reveal that banks and thrifts, either directly or through affiliates, became primary originators of payment-option ARMs. 68 Vague legal and regulatory guidelines warning against making loans without regard to ability to repay did not prevent these practices at federally regulated financial institutions. 69 Certainly, market discipline alone would not prevent these practices at non-federally regulated mortgage lenders. loans in recent years. It was the largest originator of payoption ARM loans in the second quarter of 2007, followed by WaMu, and held $122 billion of such loans. 93 The biggest originators of such loans at the time were Wachovia, WaMu, Countrywide, Downey Financial Corporation (a savings and loan), and IndyMac. 94 Wachovia was the largest holder of option ARMs. 95 According to its own website, these mortgages represented seventyportfolio. 96 Indeed, one of the very reasons Wachovia purchased Golden West Financial Corporation in 2006 was -rate mortgages, which it hoped to cross-sell to Wachovia customers. 97 The same practice of making risky loans was uncovered at IndyMac. IndyMac was one of the largest holders of paymentoption ARM loans. 98 In addition, as recently as the first quarter of 2007, only twentyloan production was in the form of full-documentation mortgages. 99 
Equity Stripping
The greatest loss of equity results from unsafe lending practices that lead to foreclosure. This is a loss faced by borrowers not only due to the overly aggressive and unsafe lending practices of recent years, but also, to a lesser extent, in prior time periods. Recent foreclosures have come in three waves, representing three stages of risk that result from the mortgage practices of recent years.
The first wave of foreclosures, occurring in 2007 and 2008, resulted from adjustable-rate subprime loans in which borrowers were unable to afford the reset interest rates and were unable to refinance their mortgages. 101 The second wave is expected in 2009 and 2010, and will result from payment-option ARMs that recast and five-year adjustable-rate hybrid ARMs. 102 Such loans were made in both the subprime and the Alt-A markets. A third wave of foreclosures has actually overlapped with these first two causes of financial difficulty. This resulted from the unavailability of credit in the tightened mortgage market in late-2008 and 2009, job losses resulting from a downturn in the economy triggered by mortgage loan losses of financial institutions, and a sharp drop in housing prices making refinancing of a large outstanding mortgage balance impossible. 103 Total loans in foreclosure averaged 455,000 annually from mortgage products is that they increase rates of homeownership and thus provide a net societal benefit. 112 Given the high-risk nature of the products which can, and have, led to default and foreclosure for many low-income and minority homeowners, embracing an outcome in which substantial losses are deemed justified because there is an overall net gain in level of homeownership is an ethically troubling viewpoint. However, the evidence has actually revealed that there were no net societal benefits in the form of increased levels of homeownership in the long-term. million families. In fact, a net homeownership loss occurs in subprime loans made in every one of the past nine years. 114 The data showed that between 1998 and 2006, about 1.4 million first-time home buyers used subprime loans to purchase their homes, but an who obtained subprime loans will lose or have already lost The expansion of mortgage credit in the 1990s was therefore accomplished with traditional products and without adding much to risk. The growth in mortgage credit after 2003, in contrast, came largely from gains in much riskier subprime, interest-only, and paymentoption loans. These novel mortgage products provided only a temporary lift to homeownership. Indeed, the national homeownership rate peaked in 2004 and has since retreated below its 2003 level.
For the rate to fall below its 2000 level, the number of homeowners would have to dip by another million a real possibility given the rising tide of foreclosures. 117 This experience demonstrates that safe underwriting 114. Id. 115. Id. A majority of the subprime loans that were acquired were for refinancing and not for the purchase of a home. Id. at 3. Moreover, a significant proportion of subprime purchase mortgages are obtained by existing homeowners who buy additional homes not first-time home buyers and therefore do not increase homeownership levels. Id.
116. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 103, at 3-4.
117. Id. at 4 (internal citation omitted).
practices can help to achieve the goal of access to credit and expansion of homeownership opportunities. Mandating such practices is the proposal presented below.
III. An Alternative Approach: Bounded Decision-Making
In recent years, commentators and even some federal regulators have recognized the deficiencies of relying on a market-based decisionperspective, a vague mandate to avoid unsafe and unsound mortgage products and practices often is ignored when the originator can generate substantial profits from potentially unsafe offerings. 118 From the consumer perspective, many consumers seem unable to judge the safety of mortgage loan offerings. 119 Thus, an alternative to relying on market-based decisions is necessary. The alternative I propose is based on principles of complexity theory, and is one I have earlier advanced in my study of business ethics. 120 As applied to the United States mortgage market, an outer legal boundary must be imposed that requires a clear, fixed, minimum level of safety for every mortgage loan. The outer boundary of safety proposed as a statutory mandate is twofold. First, a maximum LTV ratio for all residential real estate loans would be mandatory, and this would include a required equity investment by the borrower. This could be eighty percent, or perhaps slightly higher, and would prohibit secondary financing and require mortgage insurance if any loan exceeded 118 121 Under the new regulations, lenders are prohibited from making loans without regard to borrower they must assess that ability based on the highest scheduled payment in the first seven years of the loan. 122 This new approach recognizes the need for a minimum level of safety in mortgage transactions. However, the Federal Reserv differs from my proposal in four important respects. First, it does not apply to all mortgage loans it applies only to highpriced mortgage loans. Second, it states no clear standard that s no maximum debt-to-income ratio stipulated, which once again leaves too much discretion in the hands of bank management. Third, it is missing the other component of safe underwriting that I have proposed a maximum LTV ratio. 123 Finally, the fourth difference is that my proposed safety standard is statutory. regulation to avoid a recurrence of unsafe mortgage loans in the long-term.
The Federal Reserve Board issued the regulation under its authori mortgage practices should be regulated. 124 intervene in the mortgage market by defining a practice as an societal costs of non-regulation outweigh its benefits. 125 Currently, this is the case due to the very high levels of mortgage defaults and the serious economic repercussions they have produced. However, when this crisis passes, the Federal Reserve Board might threshold will no longer demand government intervention. In my view, it is preferable to have a statutory standard of safety to avoid that possible regulatory change.
The required boundaries of safety proposed in this Article avoid unfettered individual bank and consumer discretion as to what products and taught us that we cannot rely on market discipline to ensure safety and soundness. Such statutory boundaries do not eliminate all discretion or freedom.
Within these outer boundaries, lenders and consumers are free to structure the terms of their mortgage products in order aim of an adequate supply of credit provided in a safe manner.
